Stakeway, Encode Club, Luganodes, Cottage Nodes and 0xdd8fe872... (Collusion)

Proposal

That each of the five providers below be chilled under FIP.02 for collusion.

Each provider gets its own vote. These are five separate management proposals, one address each, voted individually, exactly as every sanction this group has ever passed has been voted. This thread is the shared discussion document for all five, which is also established practice: the O1FTSO and Flare Ocean case ran off one thread naming five providers, and the FTSO UK and SolidiFi Nexus case off one thread naming two, with the votes kept separate in both.

Provider Registration weight Closest peer, byte-exact Peers at or above 60% Measurement runs at or above 60%
Stakeway 0.094% 93.3% 20 292 of 292
Encode Club 0.954% 93.3% 20 288 of 288
0xdd8fe872d02942dbc3f5a2ecc62c78331430a90f 0.157% 92.2% 20 148 of 148
Luganodes 1.187% 90.9% 20 292 of 292
Cottage Nodes 0.441% 90.5% 20 203 of 204

Together they hold 2.83% of registration weight (reward epoch 441).

What FIP.02 says

FIP.02 defines collusion as:

“Collusion, defined as multiple FTSO data providers showing a strong statistical correlation in their submissions or clearly submitting through the same node.”

The first limb asks one question: do the providers show a strong statistical correlation in their submissions? It contains no requirement of agreement, coordination, intent, or common control. The adjacent definition of duplication does contain a common-control element, so the drafters knew how to write one and did not write one here.

No coordination is alleged. None is required for the definition to be met, and nothing below asserts any.

The measurement

The infraction is the byte-exact agreement, and it is the only thing measured below.

Over 120 consecutive voting rounds (1,483,208 to 1,483,327), every pair of the 98 providers revealing values was compared cell by cell. A cell counts only where both providers priced the same feed in the same round, and counts as agreement only where the encoded integer is identical to the last digit. It is a count of reveals already on chain. There is no model in it and no reference instance.

Across all 4,753 pairs of providers on the network, median agreement is 8.2%, and nine pairs in ten agree on fewer than 20% of cells. Two independent providers reading different venues essentially never produce the same integer to the last digit on a volatile feed, which is why the field rate is the natural null and why the figures below are not a coincidence of market conditions.

The five providers

1. Stakeway

Peer Byte-exact agreement Cells compared
Encode Club 93.3% 7,440
0x882ee9ce... 92.2% 7,440
0xdd8fe872... 92.2% 7,440
Luganodes 90.9% 7,440
WitterFTSO 90.6% 7,440
Cottage Nodes 90.5% 7,440

And 14 further providers at or above 60%, 20 in total, averaging 85.3%. The next provider below that group agrees with it on 50.4% of cells.

Registration weight 0.094%. It has been at or above 60% with at least one peer in every one of the 292 measurement runs in which it has revealed values, the first on 2026-08-02.

Role Address
Identity 0xaa9c30ff905d056e7dd06e0d81246c68272d63d6
Submit 0x4f45b627acf32d715cb246f0a993df93556cadc4
Delegation 0xf26be97eb0d7a9fbf8d67f813d3be411445885ce
Node 1 0xdaf8e891dcfb50a9423ece99735f57ea8e55de84

2. Encode Club

Peer Byte-exact agreement Cells compared
Stakeway 93.3% 7,440
0xdd8fe872... 92.0% 7,440
0x882ee9ce... 91.8% 7,440
DataVector 91.0% 7,440
WitterFTSO 90.8% 7,440
Cottage Nodes 90.4% 7,440

And 14 further providers at or above 60%, 20 in total, averaging 85.0%. The next provider below that group agrees with it on 50.1% of cells.

Registration weight 0.954%. It has been at or above 60% with at least one peer in every one of the 288 measurement runs in which it has revealed values, the first on 2026-08-02.

Role Address
Identity 0xf697cef9e0be6bebac06410a5bcc56f7e8f52835
Submit 0x0054a662c151a36b5b0358fd7a1a51180dad2fd6
Delegation 0x1c2bb2ca14914a462ab7268de4a48ef6445116c2
Node 1 0x5f1ab76e2d65cbc8eeb79ae464997e041283ba11

3. Provider 0xdd8fe872d02942dbc3f5a2ecc62c78331430a90f

Peer Byte-exact agreement Cells compared
Stakeway 92.2% 7,440
Encode Club 92.0% 7,440
DataVector 91.4% 7,440
0x882ee9ce... 91.2% 7,440
WitterFTSO 90.2% 7,440
Scintilla 90.2% 7,440

And 14 further providers at or above 60%, 20 in total, averaging 84.8%. The next provider below that group agrees with it on 49.9% of cells.

Registration weight 0.157%. It has been at or above 60% with at least one peer in every one of the 148 measurement runs in which it has revealed values, the first on 2026-09-07.

Role Address
Identity 0xdd8fe872d02942dbc3f5a2ecc62c78331430a90f
Submit 0x4ee74b4bd478621f51db5294d00729376b8208ba
Delegation 0xc4cceca39bdca9428b482aff538ad68558597b79
Node 1 0x61c71a6efc597378dc5c187678d923ef33e066e2

4. Luganodes

Peer Byte-exact agreement Cells compared
Stakeway 90.9% 7,440
0x882ee9ce... 90.6% 7,440
Scintilla 89.6% 7,440
0xdd8fe872... 89.5% 7,440
Encode Club 89.3% 7,440
WitterFTSO 89.3% 7,440

And 14 further providers at or above 60%, 20 in total, averaging 83.9%. The next provider below that group agrees with it on 50.1% of cells.

Registration weight 1.187%. It has been at or above 60% with at least one peer in every one of the 292 measurement runs in which it has revealed values, the first on 2026-08-02.

Role Address
Identity 0x3887d51081d03ee6b1ad8bd0dc4e2ec88683a109
Submit 0x473620d640e7df8b36b6042b3ccb2891acf8bb0e
Delegation 0xb53f6cfab63cabfc255c702ebeb273510db541d7
Node 1 0xe0f0d029ac3ac199c72bb3b96a75a7f04b9f9505

5. Cottage Nodes

Peer Byte-exact agreement Cells compared
Stakeway 90.5% 7,440
Encode Club 90.4% 7,440
Scintilla 89.7% 7,440
Chainbase Staking 89.7% 7,440
WitterFTSO 89.6% 7,440
Nansen 89.4% 7,440

And 14 further providers at or above 60%, 20 in total, averaging 83.9%. The next provider below that group agrees with it on 49.2% of cells.

Registration weight 0.441%. It has been at or above 60% with at least one peer in 203 of the 204 measurement runs in which it has revealed values, the first on 2026-08-02.

Role Address
Identity 0x781ea2dce725ca139c6ecc62c1ee7c8876608392
Submit 0x04a7aa6b6a318b525aff7bafa0269d9bef977380
Delegation 0x6ebbd69832af87434253c10f9045e012286f509e
Node 1 0xbe0ecca33898fd3ea6fd94cb73300fa7ad35a756
Node 2 0xacfa586de25f8eae7ba25e839e99a70362469030

How to verify this before voting

Do not take it on trust. Every input is public.

Each provider is named here by its identity address, which is the address the entity registry, the block explorer and the provider lists all key on. The submit address, which is what appears as tx.from on a reveal, is in each table above.

What a chill has to cover

FIP.16 registration weight is computed from two sources: mirrored stake across a provider’s node ids, and the WNat delegated to its delegation address. VoterRegistry.chill takes a list of beneficiaries, so a chill must name the delegation address and every node id listed above. Chilling the delegation address alone leaves roughly 80% of an average provider’s registration weight untouched, which is the appearance of a sanction rather than a sanction. With every leg named, registration weight is zero and require(_weight > 0) prevents registration for the epochs concerned.

Four of the five have exactly one registered node id, so a chill on each names two beneficiaries: the delegation address and that node id. Cottage Nodes has two, so its chill names three. All are listed in the tables above.

Precedent

The Management Group has chilled for collusion on this ground many times. In each case below the evidence was the submissions themselves: values that matched or moved together in a way the submissions of independent providers do not. Every one of these carried.

Date Provider Ground Vote
May 2023 FLRLabs Common developer and algorithm with LoveFTSO 61 to 0
May 2023 LoveFTSO Common developer and algorithm with FLRLabs 62 to 0
July 2023 HXK Oracle Same algorithm as Sirius FTSO 54 to 0
July 2023 Sirius FTSO Same algorithm as HXK Oracle 52 to 0
July 2023 CoffeeFTSO Same algorithm as LoveFTSO 54 to 0
July 2023 Best FTSO Same algorithm as tSovreign 47 to 1
July 2023 tSovreign Same algorithm as Best FTSO 47 to 1
July 2023 Worlds FTSO Same algorithm as tSovreign and Best FTSO 49 to 0
December 2023 FLR-Labs Same algorithm and price feeds as an anonymous provider 54 to 0
December 2023 Anonymous provider 0xe51d146c... Same algorithm and price feeds as FLR-Labs 54 to 0
December 2023 Best FTSO Same algorithm as AilandFlare 52 to 0
December 2023 AilandFlare Same algorithm as Best FTSO 51 to 0
November 2025 FTSO UK Shared infrastructure: identical price data to SolidiFi Nexus 39 to 8
November 2025 SolidiFi Nexus Shared infrastructure: identical price data to FTSO UK 40 to 7
September 2026 Provider 0x882ee9ce... Byte-identical submissions with 21 other providers 26 to 8

Three of these are worth reading closely.

FTSO UK and SolidiFi Nexus (2025). The discussion thread rested on one observation: the two were “submitting 100% identical price data”, “identical down to the last decimal in every submission”. The providers answered that it was a configuration error and not intended. The thread’s reply, which the group then voted for, was that “the claim of an ‘accident’ is irrelevant”, and that “by mirroring data, the providers acted as a single entity, not as the two independent oracles they are registered as.” That is the same test applied here: what was submitted, not why.

Best FTSO and AilandFlare (2023). The evidence was two providers “submitting near identical pricing data” over a sustained period. Near identical was sufficient. The figures above are identical to the last digit.

Provider 0x882ee9ce... (2026). Provider 0x882ee9cebe3d7b38eebd640… (Collusion) is the same finding on the same measurement as this proposal, and it passed 26 to 8, closing 2026-09-19. That provider is still submitting, and it appears among the six closest peers of four of the five providers named above.

Every sanction this group has voted, 29 of 29 across all four polling deployments, named exactly one address. There has never been a bundled sanction vote, and this is not one. Where several providers were implicated in the same case they were voted separately on the same day, four of them at once on 2023-12-19 with 51 to 54 members voting on each. Concurrent per-provider proposals are proven practice here, not a bottleneck.

What a chill means here

Under FIP.02 a first chill removes a provider for two reward epochs. A second is a permanent ban. For all five of these, this is a first chill.

This proposal creates no sanction of its own. It applies one that already exists.

The five proposals

Each will be submitted separately to the Management Group, with this thread as its discussion link. Titles and payload addresses:

Proposal title Address named
Stakeway (Collusion) 0xaa9c30ff905d056e7dd06e0d81246c68272d63d6
Encode Club (Collusion) 0xf697cef9e0be6bebac06410a5bcc56f7e8f52835
Provider 0xdd8fe872d02942dbc3f5a2ec… (Collusion) 0xdd8fe872d02942dbc3f5a2ecc62c78331430a90f
Luganodes (Collusion) 0x3887d51081d03ee6b1ad8bd0dc4e2ec88683a109
Cottage Nodes (Collusion) 0x781ea2dce725ca139c6ecc62c1ee7c8876608392

Five proposals, one per provider. A “for” vote is a vote to chill.

We support this proposal, based on the evidence gathered above, the 3rd party websites and our own analysis. The official Flare Systems Explorer consistently demonstrates all 5 providers submitting the same prices to the last decimal place.