Discussion & Governance Proposal: Repeated Violation of Independence – Links Involving Solidifi and E8T
This post compiles and presents the facts as a basis for open discussion and governance action by the FTSO Management Group. It focuses on concerns of repeated or persistent non-independence among FTSO providers linked to Solidifi infrastructure, with emphasis on the direct patterns between Solidifi and E8T.
There is only one Solidifi entity no other names or compartmentalized identities change that fact. Corporate structure does not abolish culpability of the operators. Attempts to separate entities or label operations as “independent” do not absolve Solidifi or its operators from responsibility for shared infrastructure, patterns of synchronized failure, or violations of cease-and-desist obligations established in prior governance findings.
Background and Precedent
In October 2025, governance discussion addressed collusion involving Solidifi Labs infrastructure (forum thread: Discussion & Governance Proposal Regarding SolidiFiHQ & FTSO UK ).
Evidence included mirrored/identical price submissions and shared centralized backend/hardware, violating FTSO independence (FIP.02: no single points of failure, no functional single-entity behavior).
Outcomes: Providers chilled/penalized; Solidifi Labs required to cease providing shared backend services, hosting, or infrastructure to other FTSO providers.
Recent update (February 11, 2026 @SolidiFiLabs announcement thread: https://x.com/i/status/2021614189664485429): Solidifi Labs publicly admitted to previously providing infrastructure/hosting/relationships to multiple Flare builders/providers, announced cessation of all such activities and termination of connections as of February.
Charge 1: Direct Admission of Past Shared Services and Delayed / Incomplete Cessation
Solidifi Labs’ February 11, 2026 public announcement constitutes a direct confession of having provided shared backend infrastructure, hosting, and working relationships to multiple Flare builders/providers. Key quotes include:
"We have helped many FTSO providers over the years in support of the network."
"SolidiFi Labs is ceasing all activities and any working relationship it had with other builders on Flare. As of February connections were terminated."
Apology for "optics" and framing prior actions as supportive efforts, in response to "recent sentiment and attitudes of the FTSO management group."
This self-reported history directly confirms the type of arrangement previously ruled as collusion-equivalent. The claim that termination occurred only “as of February” (2026) indicates these shared arrangements continued or overlapped into the post-chill period after the October 2025 precedent and required immediate cessation.
Contextual Relevance: Timeline of E8T (E8T.app)
E8T (E8T.app) was an active infrastructure/FTSO provider several years ago, then disappeared/inactive without public explanation, and re-emerged as an active participant — timed while Solidifi was serving out its chill/restrictions from the 2025 case.
This reactivation timing, combined with recent operational illustrations (repeated identical downtimes, simultaneous offline periods), provides important context for understanding the potential scope and persistence of shared dependencies under Solidifi Labs’ influence, especially in light of the direct admission in Charge 1.
Charge 2: Systemic Risk from Interconnected Provider Histories
Illustrated synchronized downtime patterns between Solidifi linked operations and E8T indicate single points of failure. The direct admission of shared infrastructure with multiple providers, combined with these patterns and the E8T timeline, underscores ongoing risk to oracle decentralization and network reliability.
Evidence
Direct confession/admission: Solidifi Labs thread explicitly admits prior shared infrastructure and relationships with multiple builders/FTSO providers, recent termination ("as of February connections were terminated"), and apology for optics. This is self-reported evidence confirming the pattern of non-independent operations.
Illustrative operational patterns (synchronized downtime/offline events): The following voting rounds demonstrate common, simultaneous absences (missed submissions/offline) and recoveries between E8T.app and Solidifi linked operations, consistent with shared backend dependencies:
Round 1245947: Both E8T and Solidifi present/submitting
https://flare-systems-explorer.flare.network/voting-round/1245947?pageSize=100&pageIndex=0
Round 1245948: Neither present (both offline/missing submissions)
https://flare-systems-explorer.flare.network/voting-round/1245948?pageSize=100&pageIndex=0
Demonstrating common downtime they have not recovered from.
Previous synchronized gap: Both offline starting at round 1245866
https://flare-systems-explorer.flare.network/voting-round/1245866?pageSize=100&pageIndex=1
Both recover/come back online at round 1245883
https://flare-systems-explorer.flare.network/voting-round/1245883?pageSize=100&pageIndex=2
Both offline again at round 1245919
https://flare-systems-explorer.flare.network/voting-round/1245919?pageSize=100&pageIndex=0
Both back online at round 1245934
https://flare-systems-explorer.flare.network/voting-round/1245934?pageSize=100&pageIndex=0
Neither provider has yet recovered from downtime at 1245947 as of the time of this writing
There is also evidence from a now deleted github repo showing shared development where Solidifi has developed products for E8T providing further contextual evidence of a close relationship that is significantly non-arms length.
In regards to the previous case where Solidifi labs provided infrastructure as a service for FTSO UK there is also blockchain history showing the UK delegation address supplying the initial deposit of FLR for creation of the the E8T delegation wallet address that is currently now in use demonstrating a complex relationship between all 3 providers
https://flare-explorer.flare.network/tx/0x9116d519f32d189e48074d4c504354c3fbd27225fcc1dd471547ea001ccb4776
These repeated, identical downtime periods and simultaneous recoveries illustrate the risk of shared infrastructure/failure points, especially post the required cessation.
Proposed Action: Governance Review and Vote
Initiate open discussion.
Request FTSO Management Group / community investigation into:
Current and recent linkages between Solidifi infrastructure and E8T.
Compliance with cease-and-desist obligations in light of the public admission of continued shared arrangements until February 2026.
Independence verification (e.g., separate hardware/backend proofs), holding Solidifi and its operators accountable as a single entity.
Analysis of the illustrated synchronized downtime patterns across the specified voting rounds.
Confirm any violations (persistent patterns/shared history in light of the confession).
Apply penalties of second strike to Solidifi resulting in permanent removal from the infrastructure provider services
Apply penalties of first strike to E8T
All parties (E8T.app, Solidifi) are strongly encouraged to provide responses, address ownership proofs, infrastructure independence documentation, or explanations of the timeline, and patterns. The aim is transparent, evidence-based preservation of Flare’s decentralized time series oracle system. Corporate structure does not abolish culpability of the operators for actions that compromise network independence.
